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Abstract 
 
By marshalling Kant in new ways, this thesis explores the relationship 
between cognitive synthesis and causality. It is argued that the causal 
connections constitutive of cognitive experience are of a character that is 
radically different from that of causal connections that are not constitutive of 
cognitive experience. Whereas the latter are satisfactorily covered by Kant‟s 
conception of causality as rule-governed succession this is not true, it is 
argued, of the causality that is constitutive of cognitive experience. The idea, 
introduced by Hume and endorsed by Kant, that causality is nothing but a kind 
of rule-governed succession is one that cannot be maintained, it is argued, in 
the face of considerations regarding the nature of cognitive synthesis. The 
thesis examines Kant‟s arguments in the Analytic of Principles, for the 
Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, and the First and Second 
Analogies. The aim is to show that even where these arguments fail, their 
respective failures help towards the explication of a conception of synthesis 
that is constitutive of understanding as such. It is argued that the syntheses that 
are constitutive of understanding are unspecifiable in character – that is, they 
cannot be unambiguously described and defined – and that accordingly the 
causal connections through which these syntheses are effected could not be 
instantiations of any kind of rule-governed succession. The thesis thus has 
implications for what our conception of free will ought to involve. It implies 
both that free will is incompatible with determinism and that free will should 
not be thought of as requiring any disengagement from the causal 
concatenations of nature or of human life. 
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